On June 4, 2025, the Supreme Court of India, in the landmark judgment of Nagarajan v. State of Tamil Nadu, clarified the contours of appellate powers under the newly enacted Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), which replaces the Code of Criminal Procedure. A Division Bench comprising Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma held that in appeals filed solely by a convict, High Courts are barred from either enhancing the sentence or convicting the appellant for graver offences unless such enhancement is specifically sought through an appeal filed by the State, the complainant, or the victim. This decision reaffirms the principle of non-reformation in peius—that an appellant should not be placed in a worse position for exercising the right to appeal—which underpins both natural justice and the statutory scheme of the BNSS.
The case originated from a conviction by the trial court, where the appellant was found guilty under Sections 354 and 448 of the Indian Penal Code (now re-enacted under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. Aggrieved by the conviction and the sentence, the appellant preferred an appeal under Section 413 of the BNSS, seeking either acquittal or a reduction in sentence. Notably, neither the State nor the victim filed an appeal seeking enhancement. However, the Madras High Court, invoking its powers under Section 436 of the BNSS, treated the appeal as a revision petition and proceeded suo motu to examine whether a graver offence had been committed. It ultimately convicted the appellant under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code (abetment of suicide), and imposed an enhanced sentence of five years’ imprisonment.
In setting aside this decision, the Supreme Court in Nagarajan held that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction. Section 413(b)(iii) of the BNSS permits alteration of the nature or extent of a sentence but categorically prohibits enhancement in the absence of an appeal filed by the State, victim, or complainant. Furthermore, Section 436(4) bars a court from exercising revisional jurisdiction if the party entitled to appeal against the order has not done so. Therefore, the Court declared the High Court’s action ultra vires and without lawful authority, and reinstated the original conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court.
The judgment emphasized that permitting enhancement of punishment in a convict-only appeal would compromise the very essence of appellate protection. The right to appeal, being a statutory safeguard flowing from constitutional values, must remain a shield and not a trap. If appellate remedies carry the risk of greater punishment, many convicts would be discouraged from exercising their legal rights. The Court further buttressed its view by referring to Sachin v. State of Maharashtra (2025), wherein it had reiterated that in the absence of any appeal by the State or victim, the High Court cannot suo motu enhance the sentence or convict the appellant for a different offence. In Sachin, the Court held that “in an appeal filed by the accused/convict alone, and in the absence of any appeal filed by the victim, complainant or the State, the High Court cannot exercise suo motu revision either to enhance the sentence or to convict the appellant on any other charge.”
By adhering closely to the statutory language and established principles, the Supreme Court in Nagarajan reinforced the importance of procedural fairness under the BNSS. The decision marks a significant advancement in the interpretation of appellate and revisional jurisdiction. First, it ensures that High Courts cannot use Section 436 as a backdoor to impose harsher punishment in cases where no appeal has been made seeking such enhancement. Second, it assures appellants that the pursuit of justice through appeal will not backfire. Third, it implicitly affirms the autonomy of trial court decisions by insulating them from arbitrary appellate intervention when no challenge has been raised by aggrieved parties.
The broader implications of the ruling extend to institutional clarity. Trial courts can now issue judgments without apprehension of uninvited revisions, and appellate courts are reminded to maintain fidelity to procedural frameworks. The judgment also enhances the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution by safeguarding the liberty of individuals from disproportionate judicial interference absent due process. By respecting the balance between statutory authority and constitutional guarantees, the ruling in Nagarajan fortifies due process, fairness, and predictability in criminal adjudication under BNSS.
Importantly, the Supreme Court relied not only on precedent but also on the principle of legislative intent. The BNSS, as a comprehensive reform of India’s procedural law, aims to streamline criminal trials while ensuring greater protection of individual rights. The Court interpreted Sections 413 and 436 in a manner that furthers these goals. It reiterated that judicial discretion must always remain bounded by the statutory framework and cannot serve as an avenue for judicial overreach. The judgment, while technical in its statutory analysis, is also underpinned by moral clarity—no person should suffer enhanced punishment merely because they sought legal remedy.
In conclusion, Nagarajan v. State of Tamil Nadu stands as a pivotal affirmation of appellate jurisprudence under the BNSS. It delineates the contours of High Court powers in convict-only appeals, underscores the inviolability of procedural safeguards, and upholds the protective nature of the appellate remedy. The Supreme Court’s clear and textual interpretation of Sections 413 and 436 of the BNSS will likely serve as guiding precedent, ensuring that the right to appeal remains a vehicle for justice, not a source of risk. The judiciary, moving forward, is now firmly bound to ensure that appeals filed by convicts cannot result in enhanced punishment unless the State or victim actively seeks it. This case thus represents a milestone in ensuring that legal remedies under the BNSS operate with fairness, clarity, and constitutional fidelity.
