Written by Iqra Syed
On May 20, 2025, the Supreme Court of India issued a landmark judgment that fundamentally alters the entry route into the lower judiciary. The court declared that fresh law graduates are ineligible to appear for judicial service examinations. Instead, it reinstated a requirement of at least three years of practice at the Bar—encompassing advocacy, law‑clerkship, or trainee experience—before one is eligible. This ruling, delivered by a bench led by Chief Justice B. R. Gavai alongside Justices A. G. Masih and K. Vinod Chandran, was precipitated by a petition from the All India Judges Association, which highlighted systemic deficiencies among judges appointed directly from law schools.
The legal landscape before this judgment had witnessed a dramatic shift in 2002 when the Supreme Court relaxed the minimum practice requirement, permitting recent standouts from law colleges to enter the judiciary immediately. While well‑intentioned, this move produced unintended consequences over the ensuing two decades. Reports from various High Courts underscored real-world struggles faced by freshly appointed judges—procedural missteps, deficient court management skills, and challenges in handling matters involving life, liberty, property, and reputation.
In reinstating the three‑year rule, the court emphasized that judicial competence arises not merely from theoretical understanding but from immersive participation in courtroom proceedings. As Chief Justice Gavai noted, “Neither knowledge based on law books nor pre‑service training can be an adequate substitute to the first‑hand experience of the working of the court system and administration of justice.” The bench also revealed that freshly recruited law graduates frequently stumbled over administrative, interprofessional, and procedural nuances—issues not taught in classrooms but learned in the field.
Crucially, the ruling delineates the contours of qualifying experience. The three‑year period is measured from the date of provisional enrolment with a Bar Council, and practice as a law clerk to a judge is also recognized. To ensure the integrity of this requirement, certifications must be furnished either by a principal district judge or a standalone senior advocate with at least ten years’ standing; High Court practitioners require certification from designated judicial personnel. Moreover, upon appointment, candidates must undergo a one‑year judicial training period before being assigned cases independently.
Procedurally, the court declared the ruling prospective in effect, exempting ongoing selection processes already underway under the old rules. However, all future recruitments are required to align with the new eligibility criteria, prompting decrees for High Courts and state governments to revise their judicial services frameworks within a prescribed period.
Responses to this judgment have been mixed. Proponents—including the Bar Council of India, All India Judges Association, and many High Courts—have welcomed it as a corrective to declining standards in judicial administration. They argue that the lower judiciary represents the front line of justice delivery; any inefficiency there amplifies throughout the legal system. In contrast, critics—particularly fresh law graduates and legal educators—denounce the decision as an undue barrier. Many feared that mandating three unpaid or under‑paid years of practice might deter talented individuals from less affluent backgrounds, eroding diversity in the judiciary.
This tension crystallizes in the contrasting positions of different states. While some High Courts and state governments had already reintegrated practice requirements post‑2002, others—such as Chhattisgarh and Sikkim—resisted, citing the barrier to access. These inconsistencies further motivated the Supreme Court to issue a unified mandate. Still, it leaves open the question of whether exceptions might be carved out for outstanding academic achievers, as modeled in Madhya Pradesh.
Academics and policy analysts have also weighed in. Some endorse a hybrid career path: allowing fresh graduates into structured training programmes, then gradually exposing them to courtroom duties. Such models exist in civil law jurisdictions, where judges undergo rigorous apprenticeships akin to medical residencies. Concerns remain, though, about how judicial vacancies might be affected: the immediate reduction in eligible candidates could create bottlenecks in understaffed jurisdictions.
Economically, the three‑year bar poses real-world challenges for early-career advocates lacking financial backing. Those from rural or underprivileged backgrounds may struggle during this period of low earnings and potential debt—compounded by familial expectations to begin earning or settle down. Conversely, those in metropolitan centres or with familial support may find practice more viable, raising concerns about socio‑economic homogenization of judicial recruits.
In essence, the Supreme Court’s ruling resurrects a longstanding debate in legal education and judicial staffing: should judicial appointments follow an academic, career-oriented track, or a recognition model privileging seasoned practitioners? India has oscillated between these models since independence. The current judgment firmly resets the pendulum toward the career track enriched by practical experience—though it remains unsure whether this presages a broader shift in judicial philosophy.
As this ruling ripples outward, several questions demand attention. How will High Courts operationalize certifications and training frameworks? Will state governments provide stipends or support for early-career lawyers to ease financial pressure? Will the judicial pipeline contract or innovate alternative entry routes? And finally, how will judicial competence and public confidence evolve in lower courts as more judges enter with experiential, rather than purely theoretic, foundations?
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision on May 20 stands as a defining moment in India’s judicial evolution. It emphatically declares that theoretical knowledge, while necessary, is inadequate for the demands placed on judges at the grassroots. By reinstating a three‑year practice requirement, it mandates a generation of legal actors to cultivate courtroom acumen before entering the bench. The judiciary gains, potentially, in quality and maturity; yet the path becomes longer, psychologically and financially, for aspirants—raising deep questions about equity, accessibility, and systemic design. Ultimately, the ruling seeks to fortify judicial competence, but now lies the task before practitioners, educators, and policymakers: to build inclusive mechanisms that support those who must walk that longer road to the robe.